THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK
FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 11: AN UPDATE*
Stephen B. Burbankt
I.

INTRODUCTION

My goal in this article is to provide a fairly complete summary of the work of the Third Circuit Task Force' on Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11,2 anticipating some of the questions
* © 1989 Stephen B. Burbank
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The author was the reporter of
the Task Force and principal author of its report. This text is adapted from remarks delivered to the Third Circuit Judicial Conference on September 19, 1988.
They introduced a program, put together by a committee chaired by Judge Sarokin,
that was devoted entirely to the work of the Task Force, which was then reflected in
a discussion draft. Following the Conference, and in the light of the discussion
there and other comments received, the report was revised. It has now been published by, and is available from, the American Judicature Society. See RULE 1I IN
"FRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989).
It is important to acknowledge the extraordinary efforts of the district court
clerks and their staffs, led by Mike Kunz of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and
of Sally Mrvos, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, and her staff, who were instrumental in the collection of the most important empirical data.
I The members of the Task Force were:
Honorable John P. Fullam, Chair
Professor Stephen B. Burbank, Reporter
Alice W. Ballard, Esq.
Honorable Alan N. Bloch
Edmund N. Carpenter, II, Esq.
Barry H. Garfinkel, Esq.
Professor A. Leo Levin
S. Gerald Litvin, Esq.
W. Thomas McGough, Jr., Esq.
David H. Marion, Esq.
Melville D. Miller, Jr., Esq.
Robert G. Rose, Esq.
Professor Linda Joy Silberman
William K. Slate, II, Esq.
Jerold S. Solovy, Esq.
Henry W. Sawyer, III, Esq.
RichardJ. Seidel, Esq.
In addition, Chief Judge Gibbons, who appointed the Task Force, was an active
participant in its discussions. Judge Gibbons' retirement from the Third Circuit is
the bench's loss and Seton Hall Law School's gain.
2 As amended in 1983 and, to make it gender neutral, in 1987, Rule I I
provides:
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readers of its report may have as well as highlighting some of the
more difficult choices we faced. I will not be able to cover all of
the territory, including in particular all of our empirical findings.
I hope, however, that by the end of this piece the reader will have
a good sense not only of what we recommend but of why we recommend it.
The goals of the 1988 Third Circuit Judicial Conference
were to stimulate discussion and knowledge about a legal topic of
great controversy and to focus attention on the matters treated in
the discussion draft generated by the Task Force and on those
matters that were not, but should have been, treated there.'
II.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report contains, in the text, almost an equal mix of the
normative and the empirical, and it may be useful to explain why
it was written in this manner. We could have confined ourselves
to the collection and analysis of empirical data and to recommendations supported by such data. That certainly would have
marked a change in discourse about Rule 11, which has tended to
SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND OTHER PAPERS;
SANCTIONS
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion,
or other paper and state the party's address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses
or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If
a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.

3 See supra note t; see also infra notes 38 & 39.
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be dominated by "cosmic anecdotes"' on one side (costs) and
confident assertions on the other (benefits).
We chose not to do so for a variety of reasons. First, it
seemed important to develop an analytical framework in order to
determine what data to collect and to formulate hypotheses for
testing with those data. Second, we were aware that Rule 11 jurisprudence is in a dynamic state and that it is developing in different ways in different parts of the country. We thus were aware
that our empirical data-or rather some of them-would be of
limited utility in evaluating the Rule in other circuits, and we
wanted to assist others who might conduct similar studies in
those circuits. Third, there are a number of important questions
about Rule 11 that even ambitious empirical work is not likely to
answer. However, the issues could be illuminated by careful
analysis and broadly-based conceptual approaches. Too much of
the existing literature suffers from preoccupation with discrete
doctrinal questions-for instance, does Rule 11 impose a continuing obligation, or is there a duty of mitigation. As a result,
there is a risk of missing the forest for the trees. We have aimed
for the, forest, aware, but not concerned, that we would miss
some trees.
III.

NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES

The first half of the report proceeds from our view that both
the interpretation of amended Rule 11 and practice under it are
likely to be affected, if not driven, by alternative normative perspectives-alternative purposes or goals that those invoking or
applying the amended Rule impute to it, including deterrence,
punishment, professional responsibility and compensation.
We start with a fairly traditional, although rigorous, analysis
of the Rule's language and drafting history, with particular attention devoted to the Advisory Committee Note. Our conclusion is
that the goal of the amended Rule is to deter abuse of the civil
litigation process through the detection and punishment (or discipline) of violators. Compensation is merely a subsidiary objective that may, but need not, be furthered through the choice of
sanctions and should be so pursued only to the extent that it can
be consistently with the goal of deterrence. Similarly, professional responsibility is not a goal of the Rule, although the
4 A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY

11 (1984).
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rulemakers did hope to curb specific professional abuses by defining more precisely the duties of a lawyer who signs a paper
filed in federal district court.
Recognizing that this view of the Rule's language and drafting history is not shared by all commentators or courts and that
the Rule has proved to be an irresistible invitation to some of
both to pursue their own normative preferences, we consider at
length the effect of the alternatives on the interpretation and implementation of the Rule.
A.

The Rule's Certification Standard

As we discuss, the so-called "frivolousness" clause of Rule
SlI's certification standard focuses on the conduct of the person
signing the paper that is filed. It would appear to require reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law and a good faith (honest)
conclusion based on such inquiry that the paper is "well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law." 5 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 also focuses on
conduct. 6
Most courts, however, have interpreted this language to impose not just a duty of objectively reasonable inquiry and reflection on the results of that inquiry but also a duty of objectively
reasonable conclusions. 7 In the Task Force's view, this supposed
requirement of reasonable conclusions is not supported by the
language of the Rule or the Advisory Committee Note. More important, focusing on product (is the paper frivolous?) holds little
promise of advancing the goal of deterrence (specific or general),
or of upgrading the legal profession. It does, however, provide
maximum scope for fee-shifting if that is the judge's goal. Decisions imposing Rule 11 sanctions for signing a frivolous paper
are likely to tell the signer-and others-little that is useful in
avoiding future violations. The resulting unpredictability can
lead to over-deterrence, the kind of chilling effect that concerned
both critics of proposals to amend the Rule and the Advisory
5 FED.

R. Civ. P. 11.

6 "The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the
facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule. The standard is
one of reasonableness under the circumstances." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
7 See, e.g., Eastway Const. Co. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.
1985); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1986).
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Committee. 8
In the hard case where the lawyer has done a reasonable job
of investigating the facts and researching the law and has reached
an honest conclusion that the paper is "well grounded, etc.," to
impose Rule 11 sanctions is to define as an "abuse" disagreement about the significance of the facts or the tenor of the law.
We question whether Rule 11 is an appropriate, let alone the
best, way of dealing with professional incompetence that is not
deterrable. 9
The report's dichotomy between conduct and product is
drawn more sharply than the case law supports. Many courts follow both approaches, sometimes in the same case. Others use
product as a basis for inference about conduct. The Task Force
concluded that drawing the inference is appropriate in many
cases, so long as a demonstration that the Rule's stated requirements were met suffices to defeat the imposition of sanctions for
a product that the court regards as frivolous. Moreover, when a
court is engaging in a process of inference, it should so state,
making clear that the person sanctioned has failed to rebut the
inference.
The report does not devote much attention to the Rule's
"improper purpose" clause.' ° The Task Force does, however,
question .the approach taken by some courts, which would insulate from sanctions a complaint that satisfies the "frivolousness
clause," no matter what purpose animated its filing.''
B.

Procedure

The Advisory Committee was concerned about the costs of
litigating and adjudicating Rule 11 issues-so-called satellite litigation-and in their Note to the amended Rule encouraged procedural minimalism. The Committee recognized, of course, the
8 A product approach need not have this result, if, as in the Third Circuit, trial
judges are instructed that Rule 11 sanctions are reserved for "exceptional circumstances." See, e.g., Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987). However, as indicated in the text, results (sanctions vs. no sanctions) are not the only
basis for choosing an approach, and a conduct approach is more likely to advance
the goal of deterrence (without over-deterrence) and to promote professional responsibility than is a product approach.
9 Cf. Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 196
n.4 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Other proceedings such as disbarment exist to weed out incompetent lawyers. Rule 11 was not [promulgated] for this purpose, but rather to
provide deterrence for abuses of the system of litigation in federal district courts.").
10 See supra note 2.

I1 See, e.g., Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831-32.
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obligation to provide due process. 2
One of the advantages of an approach to Rule I l's certification standard that focuses on the paper (product) is its apparent
amenability to procedural minimalism. The judge, after all,
knows a frivolous paper when she sees it, particularly if the Rule
11 issue is reached after adjudication on the merits. A hearing
would, as Judge Posner stated in the context of Appellate Rule
38, be "pointless."' 3 Procedural minimalism may also, and independently, be encouraged by a compensation perspective, on the
view that expense-shifting sanctions are only money.
The Task Force rejects the notion that judges are infallible
even when the question is frivolousness. We found evidence that
monetary sanctions are not regarded as "only money" by those
upon whom such sanctions are imposed. We concluded that the
Constitution requires prior notice and opportunity to be heard in
almost all cases under Rule 11.
Apart from the requirements of due process, neither the
goal of deterrence nor the perspective of professional responsibility is well served by procedural minimalism. Deterrence requires that both the court and the violator (as well as others who
pay attention to sanction decisions) understand what went
wrong. Dialogue may be necessary. Moreover, dialogue is necessary if the judge is to tailor the sanction to the facts. Perhaps the
dominance of expense-shifting sanctions in reported cases and in
the cases in our sanction survey reflects in part a conscious or
unconscious desire to avoid the costs of dialogue.
The Task Force also rejects the view that a motion for reconsideration is an adequate substitute for prior notice and opportunity to be heard. For purposes of constitutional law, we found no
exceptional circumstances of the sort that are required for such a
The Advisory Committee explained:
The procedure obviously must comport with due process requirements.
The particular format to be followed should depend on the circumstances of the situation and the severity of the sanction under consideration. In many situations the judge's participation in the proceedings
provides him with full knowledge of the relevant facts and little further
inquiry will be necessary.
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective operation of the pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite
litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must to the extent
possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record. Thus,
discovery should be conducted only by leave of the court, and then only
in extraordinary circumstances.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
13 Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
12
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procedure. 4 Moreover, we were concerned about the effects of a
sanction-first-ask-questions-later approach on lawyers' attitudes,
and hence on clients' attitudes, towards the civil justice system.
Finally, we have evidence that, even on a narrow definition of
costs, the procedure may not be efficient, spawning elaborate
proceedings on reconsideration and, perhaps, appeals.
Indeed, on the same narrow view of costs the apparent efficiency of a product approach and/or of a compensatory perspective may be a mirage. Frivolousness is in the eye of the beholder,
and the prospect of attorney's fees for a successful Rule 11 motion may be hard to resist. 5 Both a product approach' 6 and a
compensatory perspective can encourage such motions. Moreover, a compensatory perspective encourages the imputation of
rights to a party making a Rule 11 motion, including the right to
an explanation when the motion is denied.' 7 Finally, a product
approach may be thought to entail de novo appellate review' 8 and
hence lead to more appeals.
The prior "hearing" required need not in most cases be an
evidentiary hearing. Most Rule 11 issues (66.4%) in our sanction
survey were resolved, as they should have been resolved, on the
papers. Oral argument is appropriate in some cases, particularly
when the papers incline the judge to believe that a violation may
have occurred.
The Task Force rejects the notion that a party making a Rule
11 motion has any rights except the right to conscientious attention to the requirements of the Rule by the trial judge. We recommend that trial judges deny perfunctory Rule 11 motions
without awaiting a response and that they need not explain the
denial of such a motion. The imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, on
the other hand, requires explanation, which may also be important from deterrence and professional responsibility
perspectives.
14 See FDIC v. Mallen, 108 S. Ct. 1780, 1787 (1988) (a certain limited class of
cases demand prompt action).
15 Cf. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th
Cir. 1986) ("In even a close case, we think it extremely unlikely that a judge, who
has already decided that the law is not as a lawyer argued it, will also decide that the
loser's position was warranted by existing law.").
16 But see supra note 8.
17 See, e.g., Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083-84
(7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988).
18 See, e.g., Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986).

518

C.

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:511

Sanctions

The Task Force takes the position that the sanction imposed
for a violation of Rule 11 should be the least severe sanction that
will achieve the purpose of specific deterrence.' 9 Routine resort
to expense-shifting sanctions is inconsistent with the exercise of
discretion contemplated by the Rule.2 0 Additionally, in many
cases, expense-shifting sanctions on an attorney's fee model will
be heavier or lighter than deterrence requires. Moreover, the attorney's fee model brings with it a complicated jurisprudence 2 '
that can only increase the costs of satellite litigation. Again, however, it is perfectly appropriate for a court to impose an expenseshifting sanction (not necessarily full expense-shifting), if that
will advance the goal of specific deterrence and is otherwise indicated by consideration of the equities, including such matters as
the violator's ability to pay.22
The Task Force proposes a presumptive rule that Rule 11
sanctions be imposed on the lawyer who signs the paper found to
be in violation. The proposed presumptive rule has the advantage of reducing procedural costs, in particular the occasions for
evidentiary hearings to allocate responsibility between lawyer
and client. More important, it should mitigate the problem of
conflict of interest for the lawyer faced with a Rule 11 motion or
show cause order and, as well, the problem of official invasion of
a confidential relationship. The proposed presumptive rule will
not, however, eliminate conflicts or the possibility of overreaching. As to the latter, the Task Force believes it appropriate for a
court to forbid a lawyer whose primary responsibility is clear
from collecting a monetary sanction from the client. As to the
former, the question is one of comparative costs. To date, most
courts have simply ignored conflict problems. A few recent decisions suggest that they can no longer do so.2 3 Finally, the proposed presumptive rule is hardly ideal from the point of view of
19 Accord, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc. 836 F.2d 866, 883 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc); Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d
191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988).
20 The Advisory Committee explained that "[t]he court ... retains the necessary
flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It has the discretion to
tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee note.
21 See, e.g., Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 124-25 (2d
Cir. 1987) (Pratt, J., dissenting).
22 See Doering, 857 F.2d at 194-97.
23 See In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 985

(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1108
(1988); Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1456 (2d Cir.),
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deterrence. But neither, of course, is a system that allocates without inquiry.
D.

Appellate Review

The Task Force favors a unitary and deferential standard of
appellate review pursuant to which all Rule 11 determinations
would be reviewed for abuse of discretion. 2 4 Such a standard respects the fact that the trial judge "has tasted the flavor of the
litigation ' 25 and that the question of sanctions is a matter of
"judgment and degree."'26 It also is less likely to stimulate appeals-satellite litigation in another orbit-than a standard which
treats the question of violation as a legal question, reviewable de
novo. The latter, of course, is a standard encouraged by a product approach. If a trial judge knows a frivolous paper when she
sees it, so too do the judges on the court of appeals.
Three courts of appeals have held or suggested that expenses of appeal are available for defending a Rule 11 sanction
successfully and/or for successfully challenging a denial of Rule
11 sanctions.2 7 The Task Force rejects such a rule, finding
mandatory expenses inconsistent with the Rule's grant of discretion to the trial judge to fashion an appropriate sanction 28 and
discretionary expenses too great a threat to the exercise of a statutory right.2 9 Expenses for challenging a denial will encourage
appeals, and both rules are of doubtful validity, either because
they conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 1912 and Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38 or because they turn Rule 11 into a fee-shifting
Rule in violation of the Rules Enabling Act.3 0 Finally, the data
cert. granted sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 109 S. Ct.
1116 (1988).
24 Accord, e.g., Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d
66, 68 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 128 (1988); Thomas v. Capital Sec.
Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871-73 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc). But see, e.g., Zaldivar v.
City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,
770 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
25 IVestmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1174.
26 O'Connell v. Champion Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987).
27 See Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988); Muthig
v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988); Westmoreland, 770
F.2d at 1179-80. See also S.A. Auto Lube, Inc. v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 842 F.2d 946,
950-51 (7th Cir. 1988).
28 See supra note 20.
29 Cf Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1040 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Appeals of
district court orders should not be deterred by threats [of Rule II sanctions] from
district judges.").
•4()See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987).
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from our appellate survey do not support the argument that expenses for successfully defending a monetary Rule 11 sanction
are necessary to secure the participation on appeal of the party to
whom the sanction was awarded by the district court.
IV.

EXPERIENCE UNDER RULE 11

The Task Force's empirical studies permit us to shed light
on questions that have been raised, and assertions that have been
made, about Rule 11 in judicial opinions and in the literature.
Some of our findings are of considerable interest nationally;
others are of limited utility outside the Third Circuit.
A.

Findings of National Interest
1.

The Unreliability of Statistics Based on Reported
Cases

By comparing the data from our sanction survey with data
available from published opinions and computerized data banks,
we were able to confirm the suspicion that available opinions represent the tip of the iceberg. Published decisions account for
only 9.1 % of Rule 11 dispositions in our survey and LEXIS for
only 39.1%. Moreover, published decisions suggest a ratio of
sanctions to cases (40%) far higher than the actual ratio (19.8%).
In addition, statistics based on reported decisions cannot
capture informal adjustments of Rule 11 issues, the role that
Rule 11 plays in the settlement or voluntary dismissal of cases, or
the role that warnings under Rule 11 play in advancing the goal
of deterrence. Twenty-two of the 132 Rule 11 motions in our
sanction survey were settled, withdrawn, resolved as part of the
settlement or dismissal of the case or otherwise mooted. We
know that in some cases a price was paid for settlement or withdrawal of the motion and that in others it played a causal role in
the termination of the case. We also know that about 50% of the
district judges responding to our questionnaire warn about possible Rule 11 violations and that the great majority of them believe that these warnings are effective.
2.

Rule 11 Motions are Neither a Cottage Industry Nor
an Urban Phenomenon in the Third Circuit

We found, on the basis of our sanction survey, that Rule 11
motions were made in only approximately 1/2 of one percent of
civil cases pending during the survey period (July 1, 1987 to June
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30, 1988). Although it would be a mistake to extrapolate from
this finding to activity in other circuits, it should cause some
change in the rhetoric of the debate. More important, we hope
that our work will prompt further inquiry into the causes of high
or low rates of activity.
The Task Force suggests that contributing factors to high or
low rates of Rule 11 activity may include local legal culture (e.g.,
general attitudes towards sanctions and cooperation and collegiality), doctrine, and individual judicial attitudes towards Rule 11
sanctions as a case management device. Local legal culture, and
in particular the infiltration of New York's legal culture, seems to
3
play a part in the relatively high level of activity in New Jersey. '
Individual attitudes towards Rule 11 as a case-management device may help to explain the very high sanctioning rate in the
Middle District of Pennsylvania. 2 In any event, the Task Force
does not find urbanism a powerful explanatory concept in this
context.
3.

The Impact of Rule 11 on Plaintiffs and on Civil
Rights Plaintiffs

The Task Force's findings confirm conclusions based on reported decisions that the Rule has disproportionate impacts on
all plaintiffs and on civil rights plaintiffs in particular. Although
our findings are less striking than those previously published,
they are nonetheless cause for further inquiry.
Plaintiffs (and/or their counsel) were the targets of approximately two-thirds of the Rule 11 motions in our sanction survey,
and they were sanctioned at a rate (15.9%) higher than the rate
for defendants (9.1%). Moreover, plaintiffs were the object of
77.8% of all sanctions imposed, on motion and sua sponte, in the
survey period.
The Task Force regards this differential impact as wholly
predictable. Rule 12(a), providing 20 days for a defendant to file
an answer, 33 creates circumstances in every case akin to the limitations time bind facing some plaintiffs. Complaints are thus, a
31 The District of New Jersey accounted for forty-three of 132 Rule 11 motions
during the survey period. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania had the next highest level of activity, forty-two requests.
32 The district judges in the Middle District of Pennsylvania imposed sanctions,
on motion, at a rate (9/20 or 45%) far higher than that of the next highest district
(New Jersey - 8/36 or 22.2%).
"33 The Rule provides:
DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS-WHEN AND HOW PRESENTED-
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priori, more likely targets than answers, 34 and where expenseshifting sanctions are the norm, they may be an irresistible target,
at least for lawyers whose clients will pay for the motion. Contingency contracts are predominantly for plaintiffs, and contingentfee lawyers. have special reason to file Rule 11 motions only when
they are cost-justified.
Civil rights cases did not loom as large in our sanction survey as in the statistics based on reported decisions. Yet, civil
rights plaintiffs and/or their lawyers were sanctioned at a rate
(47.1%) far higher than plaintiffs as a whole (15.9%) and higher
still than plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases (8.45%). The same
was true of counselled civil rights plaintiffs.3 5
The Task Force regards these findings as a matter for serious concern, and we have only begun the search for possible explanations. In aid of that process, we suggest that it may be
useful to break down the category of "civil rights" cases, as by
discretely considering prisoner cases, pro se cases and section
BY PLEADING OR MOTION-MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
(a) When Presented. A defendant shall serve an answer within 20 days
after the service of the summons and complaint upon that defendant,
except when service is made under Rule 4(e) and a different time is prescribed in the order of court under the statute of the United States or in
the statute or rule of court of the state. A party served with a pleading
stating a cross-claim against that party shall serve an answer thereto
within 20 days after the service upon that party. The plaintiff shall serve
a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within 20 days after service of
the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within 20 days after
service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The United
States or an officer or agency thereof shall serve an answer to the complaint or to a cross-claim, or a reply to a counterclaim, within 60 days
after the service upon the United States attorney of the pleading in
which the claim is asserted. The service of a motion permitted under
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is
fixed, by order of the court: (1) if the court denies the motion or
postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive
pleading shall be served within 10 days after notice of the court's action;
(2) if the court grants a motion for a more definite statement the responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days after the service of the more
definite statement.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
34 Complaints were the target of 50% of the motions for sanctions and sua

sponte impositions during the survey period. By contrast, answers accounted for
only 5.3%, and answers and Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss together for only
12.1%, of the motions.
35 Counselled civil rights plaintiffs were sanctioned on motion at a rate (45.5%)
far higher than the rate for counselled plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases (8.7%).
The findings of disproportionate impact on civil rights plaintiffs and counselled
civil rights plaintiffs are statistically significant at a level of less than 1%.

1989]

RULE 11

523

1983 actions. Moreover, we regard section 1983 actions as particularly ill-suited for a product approach to Rule 1i,because the
law under section 1983 is.particularly "underdeterminate, ' ' 36 and
for a compensatory perspective, because expense-shifting sanctions pose a special risk of overdeterrence in this context.
B.

Findings of More Limited Utility

The Task Force recognizes that some critics of Rule 11 will
be alarmed by its findings and conclusions about the benefits and
costs of the Rule in the Third Circuit 37 and that some supporters
of the Rule will take those findings and conclusions as proof that
they were right all along. Both groups should recognize that
there is no bottom line in the report and should heed our cautions that any such assessment (1) is hardly the product of exact
science and (2) cannot, or at least should not, be exported to
other circuits. We know that the law is developing in different
ways in different parts of the country and that, apart from doctrine, judicial attitudes towards the Rule differ, as do local legal
cultures. In considering the benefits and costs of the Rule in the
Third Circuit, it is important to take account of attitudes towards
sanctions in general and towards collegiality and of the restrained approach to the Rule that has been encouraged by our
court of appeals.
The Task Force found evidence of quite widespread effects
on conduct of the sort hoped for by the rulemakers. Some
43.5% of those responding to our questionnaire reported an effect on pre-filing factual inquiry; 34.5% saw impact on pre-filing
legal inquiry, and 22.1% experienced an effect on their practice
in counselling clients not to file a complaint. It is obvious from
the comments and from our attorney interviews that many lawyers in this circuit are more careful as a result of amended Rule
36 Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
462, 473 (1987). See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915, 922 (1988).
37 The report concludes:
(1) Rule 11 is not a cottage industry, and Rule 11 motions are not routine, in the Third Circuit; (2) Rule 11 has had effects on the pre-filing
conduct of many attorneys in this circuit of the sort hoped for by the
rulemakers and has yielded other benefits; (3) the costs directly associated with Rule I l's effects on conduct here do not appear to be clearly
incommensurate with the probable benefits accruing from those effects;
and (4) other costs are not presently, but may soon be, a source of serious concern.
RULE 11 IN TRANSITION, supra note 3, at 95.
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11 and that many view the changes in their practice with
satisfaction.
We also found evidence of benefits in connection with the
settlement or dismissal of cases, and in the perceived effectiveness of warnings by judges issuing them. Both effects, however,
require careful evaluation because of the danger of unjustified
coercion.
The major costs of Rule 11 focused on by its critics are the
costs of satellite litigation. Various data from our empirical studies led us to conclude that, in the Third Circuit, these costs are
not clearly incommensurate with the Rule's probable benefits.
Lawyers do not seem to be spending a great deal of time on Rule
11 motions, particularly those that are denied, and neither the
procedures used nor the modes of disposition in the cases in our
sanction survey suggest an undue burden on district courts. Single-issue Rule 11 appeals are, on the other hand, quite expensive, but we expect the incidence of such appeals-which were
not numerous in our one year survey period-to decline.
The Task Force was also unable to conclude, on the basis of
the available data, that the collateral costs of Rule 11 are presently a serious concern in the Third Circuit, although we are worried that some of them may soon be. Only approximately onequarter of the respondents to our attorney questionnaire perceived that the amended Rule has chilled legal development, and
in the same group of respondents only 5% reported an effect on
their practice in seeking extension or change in the law.3 8 Nor
does it appear that the amended Rule has poisoned relations between lawyers and clients or lawyers*and judges, although it has
had a stronger negative effect on lawyer-lawyer relations.3 9
Our initial inquiries suggest, however, that the Rule may
soon have an effect on malpractice insurance availability or rates
that should raise considerable concern, and its impact on bar discipline and other professional. aspects deserves further study.
Pending such study, we believe courts imposing Rule 11 sanctions should consider possible collateral consequences and err
on the side of not causing them to be incurred.
38 A number of participants at the Third Circuit Judicial Conference regarded
this finding as cause for concern, pointing out that in that group might be those
lawyers who were previously most disposed and best equipped to expand our legal
horizons.
39 Again, there were those at the Third Circuit Judicial Conference who decried
the "corrosive" effects of the amended Rule.
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CONCLUSION

Amended Rule 11 was an experiment. It probably took too
little time to conceive-certainly it was based on virtually no empirical data.40 It will require a good deal of time to implement
and to evaluate. The Task Force's work is an attempt to substitute facts for speculation. The report provides no definitive answers. We need more facts. If our work stimulates further
studies, 4 ' I shall consider it a great success.
40

See Burbank, The Transformationof American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule

11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927 (1989).
41 The Task Force's first recommendation is that "[a] similar study should be
undertaken in a circuit with a different reputation regarding, and (as evidenced by
case law) different normative perspectives on, Rule 11 sanctions." RULE 11 IN
TRANSITION, supra note t. I have personally nominated the Seventh Circuit for such
a study. See Burbank, supra note 40, at 1957-58.

